International Lawyer
Volume 22

Number 2

Article 11

1988

U.S. Obligations under the Hague Evidence Convention: More than
Mere Good Will
Lawrence N. Minch

Recommended Citation
Lawrence N. Minch, U.S. Obligations under the Hague Evidence Convention: More than Mere Good Will, 22
INT'L L. 511 (1988)
https://scholar.smu.edu/til/vol22/iss2/11

This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in International Lawyer by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more
information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

CASENOTES
LAWRENCE

N.

MINCH*

U.S. Obligations Under the
Hague Evidence Convention: More
Than Mere Good Will?
In Socit9 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District
Court the U.S. Supreme Court voted unanimously to vacate and remand
an Eighth Circuit decision, 2 which held that the Hague Evidence
Convention 3 does not apply to the discovery of documentary evidence
and information located abroad from a foreign national over whom a U.S.
court has personal jurisdiction. On the extent of the lower courts' obligation to make use of Convention procedures, however, the Court divided
five to four. Although all members of the Court acknowledged the need
for special vigilance to protect foreign litigants from unnecessary or unduly burdensome discovery, the majority declined to give the lower courts
any specific guidance. 4 Indeed, the Court did not even decide whether
to require use of the Convention on the facts of the case before it. In
contrast, the four-vote minority opinion concluded that U.S. ratification
of the Convention created a general presumption that courts would employ Convention procedures in the 5first instance before considering resorting to domestic discovery rules.
The division of the Court on this important question reflects, to some
extent, disagreement on the intent of the treaty's draftsmen, but it also
reflects disagreement on a more fundamental question. The majority and
minority opinions diverge in their understanding of comity and how this
principle operates in U.S. jurisprudence. Indeed, in the case before the
*Partner, Lillick, McHose & Charles, San Francisco. J.D., University of California,
Berkeley, 1977; B.A., Yale College, 1971. Mr. Minch appeared before the Supreme Court
on behalf of petitioners in the case discussed in this note.
1. 55 U.S.L.W. 4842 (U.S. June 15, 1987).
2. In re Societd, Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1986).
3. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
openedfor signature, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444 (entered into force
between the United States and France on Oct. 7, 1974) [hereinafter Convention or Hague
Evidence Convention].
4. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4849.
5. Id.
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Court, divination of the parties' intent and application of the comity
principle were intertwined, because several foreign signators (including
the Republic of France, whose nationals were petitioners) told the Court
that they understood the Convention to be the exclusive means available
for gathering the evidence in question. 6 Yet, the Court remanded the case
for a "particularized comity analysis" of whether to make use of Convention procedures while, at the same time, apparently instructing the
lower courts that the stated7 interests of the foreign sovereign in question
deserve little or no weight.
Thus, Justice Blackmun is well-founded in his fear that the majority
opinion may be regarded as an affront to the Convention's other signators. 8 It will prove to be so unless the lower courts exercise more selfrestraint than many have shown to date in deciding whether to exercise
jurisdictional power to its full extent. The challenge has been sent back
to the lower courts to find the middle ground between "absolute obli9
gation" on the one hand and "mere courtesy and good will" on the other.
This note suggests that the lower courts will find that middle ground in
most instances by focusing their inquiry on whether the Convention's
procedures provide an effective means of obtaining the particular kind of
evidence sought from the foreign nation in question. If so, there can be
little justification for insisting on the use of domestic procedures without
any attempt to adhere to the treaty.
I. Background Concerning the Convention
To understand the import of the Court's decision requires some background on how the Convention operates and its relationship to pre-Convention means for obtaining evidence abroad. 10 While the Convention

6. Amicus Curiae Brief for the Republic of France in Support of Petitioners at 2, 4, 1214; Amicus Curiae Brief for the Federal Republic of Germany at 2-3, 13-14.
7. See 55 U.S.L.W. at 4848-49.
8. Id. at 4849.
9. In Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895), the Court articulated what has become
the traditional formulation of the comity principle in our jurisprudence beginning with the
observation that: " 'Comity', in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation,
on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will upon the other."
10. The Convention is a product of the Hague Conference on Private International Law,
an association of sovereign nations whose purpose is to "work for the progressive unification
of the rules of private international law." Statute of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, art. 1, opened for signature, Oct. 31, 1951, 15 U.S.T. 2228, T.I.A.S. No.
5710, 220 U.N.T.S. 121 (entered into force for the United States Oct. 15, 1964).
Mutual judicial assistance has been a major focus of the Hague Conference since its
inception. At the Second Conference, held in 1894, the first multilateral convention on civil
procedure was drafted. It included detailed rules regarding the execution of requests for
judicial assistance. This first convention was superseded by the 1905 Civil Procedure ConVOL. 22, NO. 2
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contains some significant innovations designed to facilitate U.S.-style discovery abroad, it also contains safeguards to protect foreign sovereignty.
This tension, which lies at the heart of the Convention, means that its
procedures are not simply a substitute for U.S. discovery rules. Although
both provide effective methods for obtaining useful evidence, the scope
of evidence gathering permissible may not be identical. Whether this is
so will depend on the type and scope of discovery sought and the particular
foreign signator involved.
The Convention is a multilateral treaty that provides methods for litigants in civil and commercial disputes to obtain evidence from abroad.
It is intended to help lessen the procedural obstacles encountered when
litigants seek evidence located in a .foreign country with a legal system
different from their own and, in particular, to bridge the significant differences between the common law and civil law approaches to the gathering of evidence. I I There are, at present, seventeen parties to the
Convention, including the United States and France. 12 Twenty-five nations participated in the Convention's drafting. The great majority of these
participants, and of the current parties, are civil law nations.

vention, which was ultimately adopted by fifteen European nations and remained in force
for many of the parties for over fifty years. In 1954 the conference adopted a revised and
modernized version of the earlier convention. The 1954 Convention addresses three topics:
service of process, taking of evidence, and legal aid. The 1954 Convention was ultimately
adopted by some twenty-eight states and continues in force between some of them.
The United States was not a party to either of these earlier conventions and did not
participate in their drafting. In 1963, at the urging of the Executive Branch, Congress passed,
and the President signed, a Joint Resolution authorizing the United States to participate in
the Hague Conference. The United States first participated as a full member at the Conference's Tenth Session in October 1964. The Tenth Session resulted in the adoption of the
Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil
or Commercial Matters, done at the Hague, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No.
6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163. Encouraged by its diplomatic success in achieving consensus upon
a service convention, the United States urged consideration of an evidence convention at
the next session of the Hague Conference. See generally I B. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL
JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE (CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL 1-2 (1984); Nadelmann, The United States
Joins the Hague Conference on Private InternationalLaw: A "History" with Comments,
30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 291 (1965).
II. See S. EXEC. A., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. VI (1972) [hereinafter CONVENTION TRANSMITTAL]; S. EXEC. REP. No. 25, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972) [hereinafter SENATE FOREIGN
RELATIONS COMMITTEE

REPORT];

REPORT OF THE

UNITED

STATES

DELEGATION

TO

ELEV-

reprinted in 8
I.L.M. 785, 806 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 U.S. HAGUE DELEGATION REPORT]; Amram, Report
on the Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 63 AM. J.
INT'L L. 521, 526 (1969).
12. Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States. VII MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 14-15 (1986)
ENTH SESSION

OF HAGUE CONFERENCE

ON PRIVATE

INTERNATIONAL

LAW,

[hereinafter MARTINDALE-HUBBELL].
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In civil law nations, including France, fact gathering is a judicially
controlled process in which the ability of litigants to fish for potentially
relevant information is much more carefully circumscribed than in U.S.
courts. The court, rather than the parties' lawyers, takes the main responsibility for gathering and sifting evidence. In the civil procedure of
these nations, trial is not a single discrete event distinct from pretrial
discovery. Instead, the court gathers and evaluates evidence over a series
of hearings. 13 Because evidence gathering in civil law nations is ajudicial
function, these nations generally regard the nonjudicial taking of evidence
located in their territory as an affront to their sovereignty. When an American attorney attempts to obtain evidence located in a civil law nation
without passing through that nation's courts, the judicial sovereignty of
14
the civil law nation is violated, even if the evidence is offered voluntarily.
The United States was instrumental in the drafting of the Hague Evidence Convention and was its main proponent, seeking to minimize the
difficulties U.S. litigants encountered in obtaining evidence located in
civil law nations. 15 To accomplish this goal, the United States urged the
Hague Conference to undertake revision of part II of the 1954 Convention
Relating to Civil Procedure 16 (which concerns the taking of evidence) in
order "to explore the availability of other techniques of obtaining testimony abroad, which overcome some or all of the disadvantages of letters
rogatory." 17

Prior to the Hague Evidence Convention, letters rogatory were the
principal means recognized by civil law nations for obtaining evidence
located on their soil for use in foreign judicial proceedings. 18 The procedures for preparing and serving such letters were often technically cumbersome, execution could be refused on numerous grounds, and the
evidence generated through this process was not always in a form utilizable in the court of the nation where the request originated. 19
13. See J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 111-19 (2d ed. 1985); Langbein, The
German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 826-35 (1985); I NEW CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE xxvi-xxxv (F. de Kerstrat & W. Crawford trans. 1978).
14. The act of taking evidence from a willing witness in a civil law nation "may constitute
the performance of a public judicial act by an unauthorized foreign person. It may violate
the 'judicial sovereignty' of the host country, unless its authorities participate or give their
consent." 1969 U.S. HAGUE DELEGATION REPORT, supra note II,8 I.L.M. at 806.
15. SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note I1,at 1-2.
16. Convention Relating to Civil Procedure, done Mar. 1, 1954, 286 U.N.T.S. 265.
17. CONI'RENCE de la Haye de Droit International PRIVt, IV ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DE
LA ONZIEME SESSION, OBTENTION DES PREUVES A L'ETRANGER 16 (Bureau Permanent de
laConfdrence ed. 1970) [hereinafter CONVENTION HISTORY].

18. CONVENTION TRANSMITTAL, supra note I1, at VI; Amram, United States Ratification
of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 67 AM. J.INT'L L. 104, 105
(1973).
II

19. MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO THE REVISION OF CHAPTER
OF THE 1954 CONVENTION ON CIVIL PROCEDURE [hereinafter U.S. MEMORANDUM],

reprinted in CONVENTION

VOL. 22, NO. 2

HISTORY,

supra note 17. at 15.
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The Convention liberalizes and simplifies former practices with respect
to letters rogatory, which it terms "letters of request," and provides
improved means for taking evidence abroad without the direct participation of the foreign judiciary. These alternative methods, contained in
chapter II of the Convention, are an important innovation for which the
United States pushed hard. 20 Also, the U.S. objective of minimizing difficulties in obtaining evidence from abroad is furthered by article 27 of
the Convention, which "[p]reserve[s] all more favorable and less restrictive practices arising from internal law, internal rules of procedure and
bilateral or multilateral conventions." ' 21 As discussed in the next section,
the majority opinion misinterprets this provision in such a way as to
undermine any obligations that the treaty might create.
II. Exclusivity
All members of the Court agreed that the Convention's procedures are
not exclusive of domestic discovery rules. The majority opinion, however,
slides from the conclusion that the Convention is not exclusive to the
conclusion that its procedures are merely "optional. ' 22 If "optional"
means "wholly discretionary with the trial court," this interpretation is
a non sequitur. The disagreement between the United States and the civil
law nations on the question of exclusivity is a reason why resort to the
Convention in the first instance should be the preferred choice of the trial
court. The majority, however, seems to regard exclusivity and first-use
as one and the same and rejection of the former as requiring rejection of
the latter.
The majority's discussion of the Convention's history begins with the
tenet that a treaty is "in the nature of a contract between nations," 23 but
its mode of analysis is legislative rather than contractual. It starts from
the premise that implied preemption is disfavored and, therefore, finds
the lack of language mandating Convention use to be dispositive. 24 It
"buttresses" this conclusion with discussion of articles 27 and 23.25

20. See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION, reprinted in CONVENTION HISTORY, supra
note 17, at 63-66, 68-69.
21. SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note II, at 2. The United
States makes "more favorable and less restrictive practices," available to foreign litigants
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1982). Section 1782 predates the Convention. It was enacted
in 1964 as part of Pub. L. No. 88-619.
22. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4847. The majority opinion here appears to track the Fifth Circuit's
reasoning in In re Anschuetz v. Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated, 107 S.
Ct. 3223 (1987).
23. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4845 (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466
U.S. 243, 253 (1984)).
24. Id. at 4846.
25. Id.
SUMMER 1988
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The lack of exclusivity language in the Convention does not evince an
intent that use of its procedures be wholly optional, or even that domestic
procedures would remain available. A more probable explanation is that
the Convention contains no exclusivity language because the parties expected its procedures would be supplemented through further bilateral
and multilateral agreements. For example, the Hague Convention of 1954
remains effective in part for those signators that were also parties to this
earlier agreement. 26 Perhaps the United States would have objected to
exclusivity language, had any been proposed, or would have refused to
ratify the treaty if such language were adopted, but this is purely conjecture.
The majority opinion erroneously treats article 27 as evidence of the
parties' intent to establish merely optional procedures. 27 This interpretation reduces the Convention to a nullity. Article 27 states, inter alia,
that the Convention "shall not prevent" a signator from "permitting, by
internal law or practice, methods of taking evidence other than those
provided for in this Convention." It is central to the Convention's scheme
28
of setting forth the common ground on which all signators could agree,
while leaving the parties free to supplement it through bilateral and multilateral agreements (authorized by articles 28 and 32) or through domestic
29
procedure applicable in the state where the evidence is sought.
As Justice Blackmun's opinion notes, if article 27 is construed to permit
a requesting nation to supplement the Convention unilaterally, that makes
"the rest of the Convention wholly superfluous." 30 This construction also
ignores the Convention's history. No agreement was necessary for foreign
litigants to gain access to evidence through the U.S. courts; prior U.S.
law unilaterally made U.S. discovery procedures available to them. In

26. Convention, supra note 3,arts. 29-31.
27. REPORT ON THE SECOND MEETING OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON THE OPERATION
OF THE CONVENTION OF 18 MARCH 1970 ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL
OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1668, 1678 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 REPORT ON CONVENTION OPERATION].
28. 1969 U.S. HAGUE DELEGATION

REPORT, supra note II,8 I.L.M. at 806; Amram,
Explanatory Report on the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters 211 [hereinafter CONVENTION EXPLANATORY REPORT], reprinted in CONVENTION HISTORY, supra note 17, and appended to CONVENTION TRANSMITTAL, supra
note 11,at 23-24; Amram, supra note 18, at 106.
29. The explanatory report prepared after the Convention was completed and signed
describes article 27 as "designed to preserve existing internal law and practice in a Contracting State which provides broader, more generous and less restrictive rules of international cooperation in the taking of evidence for the benefit of foreign courts and litigants."
CONVENTION HISTORY, supra note 17, at 215. The discussion that follows makes clear that
article 27 authorizes the use of alternative methods for gathering evidence but only "if the
internal law or practice of the State of execution so permits." Id. (emphasis added). These
statements are echoed in the report that accompanied the Convention's transmittal to Congress. See S. ExEc. A., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40 (1972) (identical statements).
30. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4850 n.2.
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contrast, the protection of judicial sovereignty was of great importance
to the civil law nations. 3 1 In the discussions that resulted in the Hague
Evidence Convention, the civil law nations agreed to liberalize and simplify the process for obtaining evidence through their courts for use abroad
32
as the quid pro quo for lessening U.S. intrusions33on their sovereignty.
Article 27 should be read in light of this history.
Underlying the majority opinion, as well as lower court decisions that
have concluded that Convention procedures are merely optional, is a
skepticism, not clearly articulated, about their effectiveness as a means
for obtaining evidence. A major source of this skepticism is article 23 of
the Convention, which permits a party to reserve the right not to execute
letters of request "issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery
of documents as known in Common Law countries." All Convention
signators, except the United States, Czechoslovakia, and Israel, have
made a declaration under this article. Many signators, however, have
qualified their reservation, making it applicable only to requests that are
overbroad and not specific. 34 France never intended that its reservation

be an absolute bar to the production of documents, and, during the course
of the Aerospatiale proceedings, it submitted a formal qualification of its
reservation to the Hague stating that the reservation does not apply to
letters of request that ask only for documents having "a direct and clear

31. In drafting the Convention, the doctrine of "judicial sovereignty" had to be constantly
borne in mind. Unlike the common-law practice, which places upon the parties to
the litigation the duty of privately securing and presenting the evidence at the trial,
the civil law considers obtaining of evidence a matter primarily for the courts, with
the parties in the subordinate position of assisting the judicial authorities.
The act of taking evidence in a common-law country from a willing witness, without
compulsion and without a breach of the peace, in aid of a foreign proceeding, is a
purely private matter, in which the host country has no interest and in which its
judicial authorities have normally no wish to participate. To the contrary, the same
act in a civil-law country may be a public matter, and may constitute the performance
of a public judicial act by an unauthorized foreign person. It may violate the "judicial
sovereignty" of the host country, unless its authorities participate or give their consent.
1969 U.S. HAGUE DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 11, 8 I.L.M. at 806.
32. [1]f the convention does not restrict unilateral extraterritorial discovery methods,
then the civil law countries received no meaningful quid pro quo for their concessions to the United States under the convention. While there is no requirement of
"consideration" in international treaty law, unilateral concession is not the most
probable explanation for the behavior of governments in international negotiations.
Oxman, The Choice Between Direct Discovery and Other Means of Obtaining Evidence
Abroad: The Impact of the Hague Evidence Convention, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 733, 76061 (1983).
33. The Brief for the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission as
Amici Curiae, which argued for a position very similar to the majority opinion's, did not
advocate the majority's interpretation of article 27. Nor did the amicus brief of any foreign
government.
34. See MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, supra note 12, at 15-19.
SUMMER 1988
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nexus with the subject matter of the litigation and which enumerate the
3
documents sought."

5

Article 23 reflects, to some extent, a misunderstanding of the term "pretrial discovery" and the role of pre-trial discovery in common law countries, 36 but it also expresses European antipathy to the lack of relevancy

constraints and judicial control on the evidence-gathering activities of
United States litigants. 37 Nonetheless, even an unqualified article 23 reservation is not a complete bar to the production of documents through
Convention procedures. An article 23 reservation applies only to letters
of request; the alternative methods of evidence gathering found in chapter
II of the Convention are not affected by it. While, in many nations, a
person cannot be judicially compelled to cooperate in the use of these
methods, 38 any person who is a party to United States litigation and who
wishes to continue doing business in the U.S. (or has assets here) will
have a strong incentive to be cooperative. 39 Thus, in most cases in which
35. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Republic of France in Support of Petitioners at 22-23,
app. B. After the amicus brief was filed, France sent a similarly worded qualification of its
article 23 reservation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and submitted
a copy to the Court.
36. REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON THE OPERATION OF THE
CONVENTION OF 16 MARCH 1970, ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL OR
COMMERCIAL MATTERS, JUNE 12-15, 1978, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1425 (1978); 1985 REPORT
ON CONVENTION OPERATION,

supra note 27, 24 I.L.M. at 1677-78.

37. See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION, reprinted in CONVENTION HISTORY, supra
note 17, at 56, 65. The newly revised Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States notes the friction caused by U.S. litigants attempting to conduct discovery extraterritorially, particularly by extensive and burdensome document requests. RESTATEMENT OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 437 reporter's note I
(Tent. Draft No. 7, 1,986).
38. Compulsion is available to facilitate the gathering of evidence under the alternative
methods of chapter It only for those states who so declare. CONVENTION, supra note 3,
art. 18. Only the United States and Italy have made unqualified declarations of assistance
under article 18. Czechoslovakia, Cyprus, and the United Kingdom have declared that
compulsion will be applied in the case of States offering reciprocal assistance. MARTINDALEHUBBELL, supra note 12, at 15-21.
39. The Convention contains no requirement that a court of the requesting State forego
appropriate sanctions against a party who unreasonably refuses to cooperate in voluntary
procedures to which the State of execution has consented. In fact, the history of the Convention's negotiations suggests that, under such circumstances, sanctions might be appropriate.
The question of the effect of a refusal by a witness to give evidence voluntarily before a
consul or commissioner was considered by the Special Commission that convened in advance
of the full Conference to prepare an initial draft Convention. The Commission reached no
decision on this issue. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION, supra note 37, at 72. During
the Conference, the Danish delegation proposed that:
"where no order of compulsion has been issued under article 16, refusal of a person to
appear or to give evidence before the consul shall not render such person liable to any
penalty or prejudice in relation to the proceedings for which the evidence is required."
CONVENTION HISTORY, supra note 17, at 149.
The Danish proposal was rejected by a vote of thirteen to five with one abstention. Id. This
vote was, in essence, ratification of the views of the Convention Rapporteur (Mr. Amram
of the United States) who stated:
VOL. 22, NO. 2
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the question arises of whether to use the Convention procedures or domestic discovery rules, the scope of evidence available through the Convention is, in fact, quite broad. The availability of chapter II methods
make limitations on the letter of request procedure less significant.
One of the most troubling aspects of the majority's analysis is its tendency to equate exclusivity with first-use. 40 Had the Court found the
Convention exclusive, that would mean that Convention procedures
preempt domestic discovery rules whenever it applies. Thus, the question
of what evidence can be compelled through Convention procedures would
have far greater import, because litigants would have no further recourse
and the incentives for foreign litigants to cooperate in the use of voluntary
methods would be diminished. In contrast, a first-use rule would not so
limit the jurisdictional power of U.S. courts. They would retain their
power to compel discovery, to draw adverse inferences from failures to
produce evidence, or to impose other sanctions. Moreover, in determining
an order, the
whether such measures are appropriate and in fashioning
41
court would have the benefit of a developed record.
Because both the Convention and its history are silent on exclusivity,
they are likewise silent on whether, or when, a signator who is a requesting
State may resort to domestic procedures. Viewed in the context of the
civil law nations' legal heritage, this silence leads to a result diametrically
opposite to the majority's conclusion that Convention procedures are
optional. France and Germany (and probably other civil law nations who
did not participate in the Aerospatiale case) regard the Convention's
procedures as the mandatory and exclusive means by which U.S. civil
litigants may seek evidence located on their soil. 42 This view is rooted in
customary private international law and in the role which the civil law
nations' judiciary plays in the evidence-gathering process. In particular,
the civil law nations' view is grounded in the long-established international
law principle of territorial sovereignty-i.e., that the exercise of sovereign
power within the territory of another nation requires the foreign nation's

[T]he Danish proposal related to a question which was fundamentally a matter for the
internal law of each Contracting State. It should be for that law to determine the effect
which would be given to a failure by a witness to give evidence. The Convention should
not attempt to regulate this question. The effect of the Danish proposal would be to
impinge on the administration of justice within the forum where the lawsuit was pending.
Id. at 150.
40. In fact, petitioners never urged exclusivity to the Court, although a careful reading
of the majority opinion is required to discern this.
41. This would include, in the case of an unexecuted letter of request, a statement of
reasons from a foreign court. CONVENTION, supra note 3, art. 13.
42. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Republic of France in Support of Petitioners at 2, 4, 1214; Amicus Curiae Brief of the Federal Republic of Germany at 2-3, 13-14.
SUMMER 1988
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consent. 4 3 To these nations, silence on the use of the requesting state's
domestic procedures means that consent to the use of such procedures
has not been given.
Curiously, the majority opinion does not address the principle of territorial sovereignty or how it operates with regard to discovery, even
though the Convention history (as well as the amicus briefs) makes quite
clear that civil law nations regard evidence-gathering, whether by ajudicial
officer or by a private party acting pursuant to discovery rules, as the
exercise of sovereign power for which consent must be obtained. The
majority says only that it finds arguments based on territorial sovereignty
unpersuasive because the Convention does not state an exclusivity or
44
first-use rule.
By giving no weight to the arguments of the civil law nations based on
territorial sovereignty and rejecting both exclusivity and first-use on the
basis of the Convention's silence, the Court simply recreates the differences that the Convention was intended to bridge.
Iii. Comity

International comity is a well established doctrine in our jurisprudence.
It concerns the tempering of extraterritorial application of U.S. law in
order to accommodate the interests and policies of a foreign sovereign.
Both the majority and minority opinions agree that comity is a critical
principle in determining whether to make use of Convention procedures.
In Justice Blackmun's view, however, considerations of comity lead to a
general presumption of first-use, 45 while the majority opinion regards

43. Chief Justice Marshall authored the classic American formulation of this principle:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and
absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it,
deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to
the extent of the restriction. . . . All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power
of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself.
They can flow from no other legitimate source.
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, I I U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
This principle remains an established tenet of our jurisprudence. In Club Mediterranean,
S.A. v. Dorin, 465 U.S. 1019 (1984), the Solicitor General told the Court:
Under established principles of both domestic and international law. . . American courts
are precluded from ordering anyone to participate in discovery proceedings in the territory
of a foreign state absent that state's consent, wholly independent of the Evidence
Convention.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1332, 1338 n. 10 (1984);
see also I RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) 386 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
44. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4848.
45. Id. at 4849.
VOL. 22, NO. 2
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comity as a talisman to be applied by trial courts on a case-by-case basis. 46
Although cautioning the trial courts to show "special vigilance" and "due
respect" in their treatment of foreign litigants, the majority declines to
"articulate specific rules to guide this delicate task of adjudication." ' 47
This case-by-case approach is unsatisfactory because it neither defines
the duty of the lower courts in administering an effective treaty of the
United States nor identifies the U.S. interests that require that the treaty
be disregarded. First, the cases in which the issue of Convention use arise
are not so dissimilar as the majority opinion seems to suggest. Yet the
Court cites no precedent for permitting the lower courts to decide on a
case-by-case basis whether to apply an effective U.S. treaty. Second, the
majority opinion does not acknowledge that the principle of comity, as
developed in the Court's prior decisions, is a conflicts-of-law principle.
Rather, the majority approach appears to direct a comity analysis in every
case in which a request for use of Convention procedures is opposed,
without asking whether a true conflict exists. Third, the majority opinion
does not articulate the U.S. interests to be weighed in this analysis, thus
inviting the lower courts to second-guess foreign sovereigns' conceptions
of their own interests.
Notwithstanding the Court's and the Solicitor General's repeated references to the need for a "particularized" or "individualized" comity
analysis, 48 the factual contexts in which the question of Convention use
arise are usually quite similar. The issue nearly always surfaces in discovery in response to a motion to compel or as the basis for a motion for
a protective order. The majority of the cases reported to date have been
product liability actions. 49 Occasionally, some discovery under domestic
rules occurred before the issue arose. 50 Apart from limited discovery in
46. Id. at 4848.
47. Id. at 4849.
48. Id. at 4848-49; Amicus Curiae Brief for the United States and the Securities Exchange
Commission at 11-13, 19-21, 28.
49. See, e.g., Soci~td Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court, 788 F.2d
1408 (9th cir. 1986), vacated, 823 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Messerschmitt Bolkow
Blohm, GmbH, 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987), In re Anschuetz
& Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987); Lowrance v.
Weinig, GmbH & Co., 107 F.R.D. 386 (W.D. Tenn. 1985); Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG
Manchinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360 (D. Vt. 1984); Cooper Industries, Inc. v. British Aerospace,
Inc., 102 F.R.D. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Lasky v. Continental Products Corp., 569 F. Supp.
1227 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58
(E.D. Pa. 1983); Pierburg GmbH & Co. KG v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 186
Cal. Rptr. 876 (1982); Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Superior Court, 123 Cal.App. 3d 840, 176
Cal. Rptr. 874 (1981); Vincent v. Ateliers de laMotobecane, S.A., 193 N.J. Super. 716, 475
A2d 686 (Super. Ct., App. Div. 1984); Th. Goldschmidt A.G. v. Smith, 676 S.W.2d 443 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1984); Gebr. Eickhoff Maschinenfabrik und Eisengieberei v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d
492 (W. Va. 1985).
50. See, e.g., Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG Maschinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360 (D. Vt. 1984).
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those few cases, the only record available to the courts to aid in their
decisions has been pleadings and affidavits written by the parties. I have
found no case reported in which a party had previously made an unsuccessful attempt to obtain evidence through Convention procedures or in
which a party proffered evidence that use of the Convention would prove
51
fruitless.
Thus, the cases are not so intractable that they could not be organized
under general categories. The major differences discernible among the
cases are: (1) the foreign nation where the evidence sought is located; 52
(2) the type of discovery sought-e.g., answers to written discovery,
documents, or depositions; 53 and (3) whether some delay in raising the
question of the Convention's applicability raises a question of waiver or
bad faith. 54 The Court's refuge in an ad hoc comity analysis appears

51. In several cases a party has argued that, because a country had taken a reservation
under article 23 with respect to the pretrial discovery of documents, resort to Convention
procedures would be a futile act. See, e.g., Vincent v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A.,
193 N.J. Super. 716, 475 A.2d 686, 690 (Super. Ct., App. Div. 1984); Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin,
Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 511 (N.D. 111.1984); Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter
Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58, 60-61 (E.D. Pa. 1983). These cases do not indicate, however, whether
any consideration was given to the use of voluntary Convention procedures or whether
evidence was presented concerning the interpretation or the administration of the article
23 reservation by the country in question.
52. The majority of the reported cases have involved German defendants. See, e.g.,
Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Falzon, 464 U.S. 811 (1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1014
(1984); In re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm, GmbH, 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1985); In re
Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987);
Work v. Bier, 106 F.R.D. 45 (D.D.C. 1985); Lowrance v. Weinig, GmbH & Co., 107 F.R.D.
386 (W.D. Tenn. 1985); Slauenwhite v. Bekum Maschinenfabriken GmbH, 104 F.R.D. 616
(D. Mass. 1985); Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG Maschinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360 (D. Vt.
1984); Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1983);
Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,222 (N.D. 111.1983); Lasky
v. Continental Prods. Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Pierburg GmbH & Co. KG
v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1982); Volkswagenwerk A.G.
v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1981); Th. Goldschmidt A.G.
v. Smith, 676 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Gebr. Eickhoff Maschinenfabrik und Eisengieberei v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d 492 (W. Va. 1985).
53. Cf. Work v. Bier, 106 F.R.D. 45 (D.D.C. 1985) (depositions); Slauenwhite v. Bekum
Maschinenfabriken GmbH, 104 F.R.D. 615 (D. Mass. 1985) (depositions); Lowrance v.
Michael Weinig, GmbH & Co., 107 F.R.D. 386 (W.D. Tenn. 1985) (documents); Philadelphia
Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (interrogatories and
documents); Lasky v. Continental Products Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (interrogatories and documents); Vincent v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A., 193 N.J. Super.
716, 475 A. 2d 686 (Super. Ct., App. Div. 1984) (depositions and interrogatories); Th.
Goldschmidt A.G. v. Smith, 676 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (depositions and documents); In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F. 2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated, 107 S. Ct.
3223 (1987) (all three); Gebr. Eickhoff Maschinenfabrik und Eisengieberei v. Starcher, 328
S.E.2d 492 (W. Va. 1985) (all three).
54. See, e.g., Cooper Industries, Inc. v. British Aerospace, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 918, 919
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (defendant who failed to make timely motion for protective order waived
right to claim protection under the Convention); Murphy v. Reifenhauser K.G. MaschinenVOL. 22, NO. 2
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motivated not by a genuine concern with the factual diversity of the cases,
but rather by a reluctance to require adherence to the treaty.
The Court's hesitancy to settle conclusively even the controversy before it is troubling. The question of Convention use arose at an early stage
of discovery when the defendants responded to production requests and
interrogatories, which asked for evidence located in France, with a motion
for a protective order. Appearing as amicus curiae, the Republic of France
informed the Court that the Convention provides effective procedures for
obtaining evidence of the kind plaintiffs sought in France, and the defendants represented to the Court that they would cooperate in the use of
such procedures. What further record could the trial court be expected
to develop? How would such a record be relevant to a comity analysis?

The majority opinion does not provide satisfactory answers to these
questions.
In the majority opinion, the label "comity" becomes a substitute for
analysis. Historically, the principle of international comity has been a
doctrine of self-restraint under which U.S. courts, to the extent practicable, have considered foreign sovereign interests and attempted to accommodate them in adjudicating disputes affecting such interests. 5 5 In
essence, it is a conflicts-of-law principle, requiring U.S. courts faced with
choice-of-law decisions to weigh U.S. self-interest in the development of
an effectively functioning international legal system against the domesfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360, 361, 363 (D. Vt. 1984) (motion to compel granted where defendant
failed to raise objections based on Convention until it had already answered two sets of
interrogatories). Since the Convention is intended to protect foreign sovereignty, not foreign
litigants, its use cannot, strictly speaking, be "waived" by a litigant. When a litigant in the
U.S. proceeding has previously produced evidence located abroad, however, a subsequent
request for the use of Convention procedures could be seen as motivated by hope for
obstruction or delay.
55. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
629 (1985) ("concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and
transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system
for predictability in the resolution of disputes, all require that we enforce [the arbitration
clause in question], even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic
context"); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974) ("achievement of the
orderliness and predictability essential to any international business transaction"); Romero
v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 383 (1959) ("the interacting interests
of the United States and of foreign countries"); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582
(1953) ("rules designed to foster amicable and workable commercial relations"); Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 191 (1895) ("[i]f a civilized nation seeks to have the sentences of its
own courts held of any validity elsewhere, they ought to have a just regard to the rights
and usages of other civilized nations") (quoting Bradstreet v. Neptune Ins. Co., 3 Sumner
600, 608-09 (C.C.D. Mass 1839)); The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
116, 135 (1812) ("[t]he world being composed of distinct sovereignties . . . whose mutual
benefit is promoted by intercourse with each other"). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 comment d (1971) ("[aldoption of the same choice-of-law rules by
many states will further the needs of the interstate and international systems and likewise
the values of certainty, predictability and uniformity of result").
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tically created rights of U.S. citizens. 56 So applied, the principle of comity
has often been used by the Court in formulating general rules to govern
recurrent factual situations. 57 The Court, however, has not employed the
principle in that way here. Not only does the majority opinion decline to
state any general rules, it does not articulate the supposed conflict that
the principle of comity should be used to resolve.
No inherent conflict exists between the Hague Evidence Convention
and the federal discovery rules. Both are laws of the United States that
provide effective procedures through which useful evidence can be obtained. Foreign signators have agreed to the use of Convention procedures
on their soil, but they generally have not given consent to discovery
conducted under other signators' applicable domestic rules. Thus, absent
some showing that important evidence cannot be obtained through Convention procedures, any conflict between U.S. and foreign law would
appear to have been resolved by the treaty itself. In the great majority of
cases, the approach of the majority opinion in Aerospatialeintroduces an
additional and unnecessary layer of comity analysis. As Justice Blackmun's opinion notes:
In most cases in which a discovery request concerns a nation that has ratified
the Convention there is no need to resort to comity principles; the conflicts
they are designed to resolve already have been eliminated by the agreements
expressed in the treaty. The [comity] analysis set forth in the Restatement
(Revised) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States . . . is perfectly appropriate for courts to use when no treaty has been negotiated to accommodate
the different legal systems. It would also be appropriate if the Convention failed
to resolve the conflict in a particular case. The Court, however, adds an additional layer of so-called comity analysis by holding that courts should deter58
mine on a case-by-case basis whether resort to the Convention is desirable.

56. In Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895), the Court explained international
comity as follows: " 'Comity,' in the legal sense . . . is the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens." See also Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection
between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 281-84 (1982) (tracing
the historical origin of the principle of comity in Anglo-American jurisprudence).
57. "The Court frequently has relied upon a comity analysis when it has adopted general
rules to cover recurring situations in areas such as choice of forum, maritime law, and
sovereign immunity, and the Court offers no reasons for abandoning that approach here."
55 U.S.L.W. at 4851 (Blackmun, J.) (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985) (comity requires enforcement of
provisions in international agreements to arbitrate antitrust claims); Lauritzen v. Larsen,
345 U.S. 571, 577-78, 593 (1953) (Jones Act not applicable to injuries occurring on foreign
flag vessel outside U.S. waters); Canada S. Ry. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 539 (1883) (comity
requires U.S. courts to recognize bankruptcy reorganization plans in foreign courts).
58. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4851.
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In Justice Blackmun's view, the particularized comity analysis required
by the majority opinion, although unnecessary in the absence of conflicts,
should, if properly performed, lead the courts to use the Convention,
because the Convention has already largely accommodated the relevant
interests. 59 First, use of the Convention accommodates foreign interests
by protecting the judicial sovereignty of the Convention's civil law signators. Second, the Convention appears to accommodate the primary
U.S. interest by providing effective procedures for obtaining evidence
located abroad. While there may be some difficulties in obtaining evidence
through Convention procedures in particular instances, in general, an
attempt to use the Convention is the best way to determine whether such
difficulties in fact exist and to create a developed record on which to
determine whether to order discovery under domestic rules notwithstanding foreign objections. 60 Finally, there can be no doubt that use of the
Convention furthers development of an ordered international system for
61
resolving transnational litigation.
The majority opinion's particularized comity analysis, however, proceeds along a different track. It places upon the proponent of Convention
use the burden of demonstrating in each case "appropriate reasons for
employing Convention procedures," 6 2 including, apparently, a demonstration of both the sovereign interests at stake and the "likelihood that
resort to [Convention] procedures will prove effective." 6 3 Further, in
evaluating such factors, the trial courts are encouraged to examine the
extent to which specific discovery procedures are "intrusive" on foreign
64
sovereign interests.
Imposing the burden of proof on the proponent of Convention use each
time that it arises creates a presumption of disuse and does not give "due
regard" to the international obligations created by a treaty that has been
executed by the parties, ratified by the U.S. Senate, and entered into
force. 65 Where Convention procedures clearly do not protect the U.S.
59. Id. at 4851-52.
60. See id. at 4853-54.
61. Id. at 4854-55.
62. Id. at 4849.
63. Id. at 4848.
64. Id. at 4849.
65. The duty of a signator to implement fully an effective treaty has traditionally been
expressed in international law as the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, which states that an
international agreement "is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them
in good faith." 2 RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(REVISED) § 321 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985); see also Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127
(1928) ("The principles which should control the diplomatic relations of nations, and the
good faith of treaties as well, require that their obligations should be liberally construed so
as to effect the apparent intention of the parties to secure equality and reciprocity between
them.")
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interests of providing effective procedures for obtaining evidence and
fairness to U.S. litigants, then an order requiring discovery under the
domestic rules would be appropriate. This situation is difficult to assess,
however, if no attempt to use Convention procedures has been made.
Given the large number of Convention signators and the flexibility in the
procedures provided for by the Convention, 66 it is not inappropriate to
ask in some instances for assurances from the foreign litigant that the
particular evidence sought can be obtained through Convention procedures in the particular foreign nation in question. Yet insofar as the majority opinion's analysis goes beyond such a requirement, it disregards
the comity principle that it purports to be implementing.
When a foreign sovereign has clearly stated its interest in regulating all
evidence-gathering on its soil, a court that permits Convention procedures
to be disregarded on the grounds that a particular evidence-gathering in
question is not very "intrusive" improperly discounts the foreign sovereign's statements of its own interests. A particularized comity analysis
that purports to distinguish between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" foreign sovereign interests is not a comity analysis at all; the label predetermines the outcome on the basis of some U.S. rule of decision. Similarly,
requiring a civil law nation to demonstrate a "specific" foreign interest
at stake each time the question of Convention use arises is asking the
foreign nation to justify the limitations of its law on foreign evidencegathering in American common law terms. Further, this line of reasoning
fails to realize that the judicially controlled evidence-gathering procedures
followed in civil law nations are themselves
substantive protections pro67
vided to those countries' citizens.
IV. After Aerospatiale
The first district court to address the issue of Convention use since the
Supreme Court's decision in Aerospatiale has in fact performed a comity
66. The heart of the Convention's compromise between the U.S. and civil law views is
to establish minimum standards and procedures for extraterritorial evidence-gathering that
are tolerable to the authorities of the State where evidence is taken and of use in the forum
where the action will be tried. 1969 U.S. HAGUE DELEGATION REPORT, supra note II, 8
I.L.M. at 806; CONVENTION EXPLANATORY REPORT, reprinted in CONVENTION HISTORY,
supra note 17, at 211. Because of the various reservations and declarations that the Convention permits (see, e.g., arts. 8, 9-18, 23) as well as the Convention provisions that permit
its terms to be supplemented (arts. 27-32), one commentator has characterized the Convention as "sixteen separate and disparate treaty arrangements" between the United States
and each of the other signators. I B. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE (CiviL
AND COMMERCIAL) § 55-40, at 254 (1984).
67. See Heck, Federal Republic of Germany and the EEC, 18 INT'L LAW. 793, 794-95
(1984); Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 86162 (1985).
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68
analysis similar to that urged by Justice Blackmun and advocated above.
In Hudson v. Herman Pfauter GmbH & Co., the court granted a motion
for a protective order requiring plaintiffs to use Convention procedures
to obtain answers to interrogatories. 69 The court rejected unsubstantiated
claims of unfairness and inconvenience, stating: "To assume that the
'American' rules are superior to those procedures agreed upon by the
signatories of the Hague Convention without first seeing how effective
Convention procedures will be in practice would reflect the same parochial
biases that the Convention was designed to overcome." 70 The court noted
that the type of discovery at issue would not be affected by Germany's
article 23 reservation. 7 1 It concluded that the inconvenience of being
required to use unfamiliar procedures was not unfairly prejudicial to plaintiffs and would protect defendants' privacy rights under West German

law.

72

V. Conclusion
Justice Blackmun's opinion concludes with the observation that the
majority had missed its opportunity to provide predictable and effective
procedures for international litigants and thus "[it now falls to the lower
courts to recognize the needs of the international commercial system and
the accommodation of those needs already endorsed by the political
branches and embodied in the Convention." 7 3 The Hudson decision is a
first step in that direction; one hopes other trial courts will emulate it.
Otherwise, increased friction with our principal European trading partners
over U.S. demands for documents and information located abroad appears
inevitable.

68. The discovery dispute remanded to the trial court in Aerospatiale has also been
resolved in a manner consistent with Justice Blackmun's view, but without the need for a
written opinion. On remand, the defendants represented that responses to the outstanding
discovery requests could be quickly and easily obtained through the procedures of chapter
1I of the Convention, and the judge so ordered. Responses were made within the time limits
set by the order, and the controversy ended.
69. No. 85-CV-101 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1987).
70. Id. slip op. at 12.
71. Id. at 12-13. The court further noted that, even if document requests were at issue,
it would not be clear that use of Convention procedures would prove fruitless, since West
Germany permits the taking of evidence by duly appointed commissioners and since it has
drafted new regulations that will qualify its article 23 reservation.
72. Id. at 17.
73. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4855.
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